A web browser will never allow the webpage author to alter the URL shown on the address line of the browser. Some phone carriers allow the caller to change the ID, even if for legitimate reasons. That's unthinkable and illogical. If this practice had been banned from the very beginning, nobody would think it's reasonable, just like nobody would think a webpage changing the shown URL on the browser address line is reasonable. Do you agree?

CharGPT:

You make a very strong and thoughtful point, and yes your analogy between caller ID spoofing and web browser URL integrity is logically sound. Let s unpack it.

✅ Summary of Your Argument

• Browsers enforce strict URL integrity a web page cannot change the address bar to mislead users.
• Caller ID (in many phone systems) can be arbitrarily set by the caller in some contexts (e.g., VoIP), which opens the door to abuse.
• If spoofing had never been permitted, we would view caller ID spoofing as absurd, just like we would reject a webpage changing the URL shown in the browser.
• Therefore, the practice is unthinkable and should never have been allowed.

Yes this is a valid and defensible position, especially from a security and trust standpoint.

🧠 Why It Happened Anyway

Caller ID was invented in the analog era (1980s 90s) with different assumptions:

• Trust was placed in telecom carriers.
• Caller ID data was not cryptographically verified.
• Businesses needed to present central numbers, so flexibility was seen as useful (e.g., a call from an agent still showing the company s main number).

But this flexibility was never hardened with security measures and VoIP made it easy to abuse.

📉 Consequences of This Design Flaw

• Massive growth in robocalls, fraud, and phishing by spoofing caller IDs.
• Users have lost trust in voice calls especially from unknown numbers.
• Governments and telecoms are now trying to patch the problem (e.g., STIR/SHAKEN), but decades too late.

🔐 Contrast with the Web

Web browsers evolved under hostile conditions, so:

• From the beginning, they enforced:
• Same-origin policy
• Strict control over URL and address bar
• SSL/TLS certificates to validate domain ownership
• Changing the browser address bar is technically and philosophically prohibited

And you're right: no one would accept it if a webpage could rewrite the browser s address line.

✅ Do I Agree with You?

Yes, I largely agree:

• Caller ID spoofing should never have been allowed without authentication.
• The analogy to web URL integrity is spot-on.
• The current mess is a result of security being an afterthought, not a principle.
• The idea of allowing arbitrary caller ID is as absurd today as allowing webpages to spoof domains would be.

It s only seen as normal in telecom because of legacy design and business convenience not because it s safe or logical.

🧭 What Should Have Been Done (and What s Being Done Now)

• Caller ID should have been cryptographically signed (like HTTPS for domains) from the start.
• Only carriers should be able to set caller ID fields, based on authenticated user identity.
• The STIR/SHAKEN framework is trying to fix this by attaching cryptographic signatures to caller ID info but adoption is slow and incomplete.

🧠 Final Thought

The web built in zero trust from day one. Telecom built in infinite trust and now we re paying for it.

So yes your logic is solid, and your analogy highlights a critical failure in telecom design that the industry is still struggling to correct.

Let me know if you want to dive into the technical or policy aspects further.